I am proposing here something which could facilitate and give more flexibility to the protocol when it comes to working on integrations and partnerships with other protocols.
The protocol currently issues ~2.8m ANGLE tokens each week for liquidity mining. This rate is divided by 1.007 every week (so that each year inflation rate decreases by a factor 1.5).
In the new veANGLE system, people are able to vote for where to allocate ANGLE emissions on-chain.
Distribution now happens through 2 smart contracts: the
GaugeController where people vote and the
AngleDistributor which reads from the
GaugeController and distributes reward. The
AngleDistributor contract controls the rate of emission of the ANGLE tokens. This means that notably ANLE emissions rate will be hard coded.
Governance will still be able to vote for changing it.
What we propose here is to decrease the on-chain rate coded in the
AngleDistributor by 5% to create an allocation of ANGLE that can be used without vote by the Core Team for partnerships with other protocol and integrations.
Overall, this means that ANGLE emissions would not increase with respect to what is planned, but that instead of having gauge and veANGLE holders voting for 100% of the ANGLE emissions, they would only vote for 95% of it, the rest used (or not) by the Core Team to smoothen some integrations.
For cross-chain expansion, one strategy to grow is to partner with DEXes. Sometimes partnerships require a commitment of tokens for a certain amount of time: like $30k worth of ANGLE rewards for 1 month time. While this could be voted on-chain, it gives more flexibility to be able to tap in the pocket of 5% and opens the door to more of such programs. This is what we could do with Pangolin on Avalanche, with NEARPad on NEAR/Aurora, with SpookySwap/Scream/Creditum on Fantom.
For bribes also, while there is a gauge for it, if we were just using this in the first week, we would be bribing using just one week’s worth of ANGLE emissions, meaning our bribe next week would be significantly lower than what it could be: with a 5% left aside allocation, we could tap into future’s weeks emissions to increase the bribe, while making sure that overall ANGLE emissions remain unchanged.
Last, some incentive programs may only be made to last for a short amount of time, and so it may create too much overhead and complexity to create a gauge on which people vote for it. The 5% pocket could specifically be used for such programs and to avoid creating gauges.