Thanks for this point @pscott!
As far as I see, there are several options discussed here:
- opening SLPs deposits and withdrawals and rewarding them with 30% of the profits from the hack immediately
- opening only SLPs withdrawals and distributing 30% of the hack profits over a 30 days timeframe through the gauge contract corresponding to each collateral.
On the distribution of the profits, given that in case of a loss for the hack, all SLPs would have probably been equally impacted (the slippage parameter in the protocol looked into the global collateral ratio), my proposal is to spread profits between all SLPs (USDC, DAI, FRAX, FEI and wETH) proportionally to the share they represent in the TVL.
This Excel file gives the breakdown that would correspond to this.
I think this can be moved to a vote as soon as possible so SLPs know what they’ll be getting and when.