This is a discussion for how the protocol can best move forward now that agEUR has been voted as senior within the protocol’s Core Module in the case of a loss not automatically handled by the protocol’s smart contracts (like the Euler hack). Note that at this point, this is not meant to be a formal proposal, but more thoughts and ideas worth discussing.
All of this, of course, reflects only the views of Angle Labs. Any suggestions put forth would need to be voted on further by the DAO.
TL;DR
agEUR seniority means that its peg can be defended using the available collateral reserves in the protocol. Unpausing the Core Module as it stands could be dangerous for agEUR’s stability as it means that agEUR would be redeemable against USDC but with no hedging mechanism or over-collateralization provided by SLPs (paused till no funds are received back from Euler). And the protocol would not be able to handle unfavorable USD/EUR price variations. To this extent, we suggest swapping some of the USDC reserves of the protocol into EUROC to be added on Curve to maintain agEUR’s peg. This would be a short-term patch in line with a new scalable and resilient long-term plan for agEUR.
Context
The Euler DAO recovered most of the stolen funds back. If a proportional amount of what has been repaid was given back to the protocol, the protocol should be able to make all its stakeholders whole.
It’s however very likely that the repayment process by the Euler DAO is going to take some time. And as it stands, the protocol does not have enough funds at hand to handle the claims of all its stakeholders. From this document based on data publicly available on-chain though, Angle currently has enough reserves to handle the value of agEUR’s claims from the Core module. agEUR remains a depegged stablecoin, and as seniority is clear, even if there remain some uncertainties due to the Euler situation, now is the time to work to restore agEUR’s peg.
Technically, unpausing redemptions for agEUR holders and keeping it paused for SLPs and HAs (for as long as Euler DAO has not repaid the protocol) could honor the seniority of agEUR holders, with them being the first one able to access the collateral reserves of the protocol. This would also automatically bring agEUR back to peg.
Yet, Angle Core module is a system meant to work with three types of agents being active on the platform. Having the Core module open just for agEUR holders but with no possibility for HAs and SLPs to enter and exit (because of the potential outstanding loss faced by the protocol on Euler) could create some risk for agEUR. In the absence of hedging provided by HAs and of over-collateralization by SLPs, the protocol would notably be fully exposed to the USD/EUR exchange risk. It would not be able to handle unfavorable USD/EUR prive variations, and it could end up being under-collateralized for agEUR holders, which could depeg agEUR.
In “normal” conditions as well, there are some limits with the Core module, notably evinced during the weekend before the hack with the USDC depeg. Because of the rapid USDC price decrease, most of the hedging agents got liquidated which left the protocol badly hedged, and at the same time, people came to redeem agEUR for USDC with USDC at a very cheap value (at around $0.9), which led to a non negligible decrease in the protocol surplus.
It’s therefore crucial to think not only on how to solve the current situation, but also on how to take advantage of it as a good occasion to get rid of the technical debt at the protocol level, and to build a system that is more resilient, robust and scalable than what we previously had.
Note that during and after the hack, and during the USDC depeg as well, the Borrowing module worked exactly as expected with borrowers repaying their debt (at a lower agEUR price) and liquidations still working properly with no bad debt accrued. The Curve direct deposit module worked as well (because it was exposed to EUROC which did not depeg): it was safely wound down, even allowing the protocol to make a profit from the liquidity removal operation.
Suggestions for the way forward
agEUR’s peg needs to be restored as soon as possible, but this should be done without compromising on the long term viability of the protocol.
We’re currently working on a new potential design for the protocol’s Core module. The idea is to have a system based on a price stability module (2.0) built around Curve, that improves over Maker and FRAX design, and that diversifies risk by accepting different € stablecoins as a collateral, with automated circuit breakers to handle transient depeg events in the backing. We’ll share more details on our upcoming design idea in the coming weeks.
To launch the protocol without taking more risk than in the previous Core module setup, and potentially prepare for this vision of a new and improved design to maintain agEUR stability, we suggest to swap the USDC backing the agEUR issued by the Core module into EUROC. Idea would then be to add EUROC liquidity on the agEUR-EUROC Curve pool with a governance multisig whenever agEUR trades under peg. This would effectively allow people to “burn” agEUR for EUROC (instead of USDC through the Core module), and hence bring agEUR back to peg. Note that the Curve direct deposit module could be reactivated such that people could also effectively mint agEUR as well from this system by swapping EUROC to agEUR (as the protocol would mint agEUR in the pool whenever it is imbalanced).
The protocol would own EUROC, and would be exposed to the EUROC risk (just like it was exposed for agEUR holders to the USDC risk), and it would also be exposed to risks on Curve since it’ll have liquidity there.
This way to restore agEUR’s peg is just a short term patch to the current situation, it is however nowhere near the protocol should be, in terms of scalability and resilience. The goal with this swap again is first to restore agEUR’s peg quickly while:
- Euler hack proceeds have not been repaid
- A better system (e.g a new Core Module version) has not been voted, audited and deployed
Comments
If this suggestion gets positive feedback, we could further specify the technical elements for the swap and the Curve rebalancings.
EUROC on-chain liquidity is currently low. And it’s impossible to swap more than 7 figures of USDC into EUROC without a high slippage.
Reducing the cost of such trade for the DAO would imply doing an OTC trade. Market makers with a Circle KYC could handle a ~$18.5m USDC-> EUROC OTC trade with the Angle DAO with limited fees. The swap could be split in multiple smaller swaps.
Overall, this trade would drastically increase EUROC liquidity, which seems like an acceptable trade-off to make in the short term to rapidly lay-out strong foundations for agEUR during this period where Euler situation is not final. We could discuss later on on the diversification in the collateral reserves of the protocol (from EUROC to EURe or EUROe for example).
The protocol would surely not add directly all the acquired EUROC on Curve. Liquidity could be added little by little as agEUR are swapped on the market for EUROC. We could define price, pool imbalance or time thresholds upon which the governance should rebalance the Curve pool.
As expressed above, we suggest to keep SLPs and HAs paused on the Core module until funds are received from Euler. We could then at this point discuss on how to unpause them, and whether for instance the protocol should continue operating yield strategies for the profit of SLPs.
These are just thoughts on what we believe are the most optimal way to get out of the situation in the short term. Happy to hear any feedback to collectively arrive to a better plan for the protocol and its stakeholders.