After the Angle Protocol upgrade, most of the governance of the protocol is going to be passed off-chain through Snapshot.
The idea is that people will vote off-chain for proposals that will then be implemented by a governance multisig. The reason for this is that on-chain votes are expensive and that there are empirically significantly less people participating than Snapshot votes.
Since the role of the multisig is really to implement the proposals on Snapshot, it is crucial that members of the multisig remain trusted members incentivized for the long term success of the protocol.
The question that now comes is who should be in the multisig and how many people should there be?
- The Sushi one (and Curve, Abracadabra, …) where trusted members of the crypto community make up the multisig. The risk with too influential people is that they don’t even take the time to vote.
- The Element Finance one where members of the multisig are the ones with the most voting power (on Snapshot you’ll be able to delegate your voting power under the form of veANGLE to someone else).
Anyway, it’s a good idea in all cases to have people who can vote fast and who remain aware of all the decisions related to the protocol. That’s why I believe it’s also important to keep Core Team members in the community.
Happy to hear everyone’s thoughts about it! I believe we could take advantage of this discussion to bring some influential people of the community in the protocol
I would advise on-chain voting (with a quorum) as a backup just in case the multisig is lost. ANGLE should remain the keyholders but can delegate authority to a multisig.
Having delegates (a board of directors) is quite a nice feature, but I would mix some with voting power and some knowledgeable people, and some Core Team members that actually know how the sausage is made. Some might be in many categories, it’s just a list of what you might want looking for.
The question is the amount of delegation. If they just have to issue a transaction validated by an off-chain vote, they are acting merely as institutional trustees and should just click when instructed to click.
On the other side, they might be tasked to provide feedback to inform the voters on the proposals or even to be allowed to take emergency actions if/when needed.
We are voluntarily changing the veANGLE contract compared with Curve implementation to make it compatible with OpenZeppelin Governor Bravo, and open the door to on-chain voting with veANGLE tokens.
Interesting to hear your thoughts about the composition of it. What i had in mind was that the multisig would just have to push the button when instructed to click. I think it’s more the role of the core team to inform voters on the proposals.
There is another multisig involved in the protocol that we call the guardian that has some power within the protocol. It can pause contracts, change some key parameters but it cannot access the protocol’s funds and collateral, change oracles or change yield strategies.